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Abstract— In this paper, we introduce a hybrid approach for 
certifying security properties of cloud services that combines 
monitoring and testing data.  The paper argues about the need 
for hybrid certification and examines some basic 
characteristics of hybrid certification models. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The certification of cloud service security has become a 
necessity due to on-going concerns about cloud security and 
the need to increase cloud trustworthiness through rigorous 
assessments of security by trusted third parties [1][2]. Unlike 
the certification of security in traditional software systems, 
which is based on static forms of security assessment (e.g., 
the Common Criteria model [11]), the certification of cloud 
service security requires continuous assessment [5]. This is 
because cloud services are provisioned through dynamic 
infrastructures operating under security controls and other 
configurations that may change dynamically introducing 
unforeseen vulnerabilities. Cloud service security can also be 
compromised because of attacks on co-tenant services. 
Recent work on cloud service certification applies 
dynamic forms of security assessment, notably dynamic 
testing (e.g., [4]) or continuous monitoring (e.g., [6][10]). 
These overcome some of the limitations of traditional 
security certification and audits (e.g. they produce machine 
readable certificates incorporating dynamically collected 
evidence). However, there are cases where existing 
approaches cannot provide an adequate level of assurance. 
Testing, for instance, may be insufficient for transactional 
services, as it is normally performed through a special testing 
(as opposed to the operational) service interface. Monitoring 
based certification may also be insufficient if there is 
conflicting or inconclusive evidence in monitoring data; such 
data may, for example, not cover all traces of system events 
that should be seen to assess a property. 
To overcome such problems, we are working on a hybrid 
approach for certifying cloud service security that could 
combine both monitoring and testing evidence. Our approach 
is based on the cloud certification framework of the 
CUMULUS project [1]. In this paper, we introduce the basic 
concepts of hybrid certification models and present examples 
of such models formalised using EC-Assertion (i.e., the 
monitoring language of the CUMULUS framework). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 
reviews related work; Sect. 3 introduces hybrid certification 
models, giving formal examples of such models; and Sect. 4 
presents concluding remarks and directions of future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Dynamic cloud security certification is the focus of some 
recent work. The Cloud Security Alliance has generated the 
STAR self-assessment certification framework [6]. STAR is 
limited to monitoring and, to the best of our knowledge, is 
not implemented yet. A configurable cloud certification 
framework allowing the definition and realisation of 
different monitoring based cloud certification models is 
described in [10]. Monitoring has also been combined with 
model checking techniques to assess properties of software 
cloud services in [7]. A test based security certification 
scheme for cloud services has been proposed in [12]. 
Providing security assurance through IT audits has been the 
norm in industrial practice. IT audits, however, focus on 
providing guidelines for inspection of security controls on IT 
and cloud infrastructures and they are not automated [3][8].  
III. HYBRID CERTIFICATION MODELS 
A. Background: CUMULUS Certification framework 
Our work on hybrid security certification is part of the 
EU Project CUMULUS, which focuses on incremental, 
multiple evidence and multi-layer cloud service security 
certification. In CUMULUS, certification is a process that is 
carried out according to a certification model [13]. This 
model defines: (i) the security property to be certified, (ii) 
the cloud service that this property applies to (aka target of 
certification (TOC)), (iii) the evidence that should be used 
to assess the property, (iv) the conditions that determine the 
sufficiency of evidence for issuing a certificate for the 
property, and (v) ways to treat conflicts in the evidence.  
CUMULUS offers a monitoring infrastructure for 
realising monitoring based certification models based on 
EVEREST [10]. EVEREST enables the monitoring of 
runtime events produced by distributed systems based on 
rules and assumptions expressed in an Event Calculus based 
language, called EC-Assertion [10]. Rules express conditions 
that must be satisfied at all times by runtime events, whilst 
assumptions express the ways of deducing information from 
such events (e.g. the state of the monitored system). Both 
rules and assumptions are defined in terms of events and 
fluents. An event is something that occurs at a specific 
instance of time and has instantaneous duration. Fluents 
represent system states and are initiated and terminated by 
events. The basic predicates used by EC-Assertion are: 
• Happens(e,t,[L,U]) – This predicate denotes that an event e 
of instantaneous duration occurs at some time point t 
within the time range [L,U]. An event e is specified as 
e(_id,_snd,_rcv,TP,_sig,_src) where _id is its unique id of 
it, _snd is its sender, _rcv is its receiver, _sig is its 
signature, and _src is the source where e was captured 
from.  TP is the event’s type. EC-Assertion offers three 
built-in event types: (a) captured operation calls (REQ), (b) 
captured operation responses (RES) and (c) forced 
operation execution events (EXC), i.e., operation 
executions triggered by the monitor itself.  
• Initiates(e,f,t) – This predicate denotes that a fluent f is 
initiated by an event e at time t. 
• Terminates(e,f,t) – This predicate denotes that a fluent f is 
terminated by an event e at time t. 
• HoldsAt(f,t) – This is a derived predicate denoting that a 
fluent f holds at time t. HoldsAt(f,t) is true if f has been 
initiated by some event at some time point t’ before t and 
has not been terminated by any event within [t’,t]. 
B. Hybrid certification models   
The key concept underpinning a hybrid certification 
model is to cross-check evidence regarding a security 
property that has been gathered from testing and monitoring 
and, provided that there is no conflict within it, to combine it 
providing assurance for properties. Consider, for example, a 
scenario where the property to be certified is cloud service 
availability. If availability is measured as the percentage of 
the calls to service operations for which a response was 
produced with a given time period d, a monitoring check 
should verify exactly this condition. However, the trace of 
service calls that has been examined by the monitoring 
process might not cover all the operations in the service 
interface or the expected peak workload periods of the 
underlying infrastructure. In such cases, before issuing a 
certificate for service availability, it would be necessary to 
test any of the above service usage conditions that have not 
been covered yet. The combination of monitoring and testing 
can be attempted in two basic modes:  
(1) The dependent mode – In this mode, a security property 
is assessed for a TOC by a primary form of assessment 
(monitoring or testing) which triggers the other (subordinate) 
form in order to confirm and/or complete the evidence 
required for the assessment. 
(2) The independent mode – In this mode, a security property 
is assessed for a TOC by both monitoring and testing 
independently without any of these assessments being 
triggered by outcomes of the other. Then at specific points 
defined by the evidence sufficiency conditions of the 
certification model the two bodies of evidence are correlated 
and cross-checked to complete the hybrid assessment. 
 Beyond the elements of certification models that were 
overviewed in III.A, a hybrid certification model should also 
define: (a) the mode of hybrid certification; (b) the way of 
correlating monitoring and testing evidence; (c) conditions 
for characterising these types of evidence as conflicting, and 
(d) the way in which a final overall assessment of the 
property can be generated based on both types of evidence. 
In the following, we give examples of hybrid certification 
models of both modes, formalise them in EC-Assertion and 
use this formalisation to examine generic relationships that 
exist in hybrid models.  
C. Example 1: Hybrid, dependent mode models  
Our first example shows the use of a hybrid approach in 
certifying data integrity-at-rest. As defined in [9], this 
property expresses the ability to detect and report any 
alteration of stored data in a target of certification (TOC).  
To demonstrate the difference between monitoring and 
hybrid certification models, we first present the monitoring 
certification model for data integrity-at-rest, expressed by the 
EC_Assertion monitoring rule R1 that is listed below. The 
specification of this rule as well as all models in the paper, 
assumes the following agents and variables denoting them: 
service consumers (_sc), target of certification (_TOC), 
authentication infrastructure (_AI), certification authority 
(_CA). 
Rule R1: 
Happens(e(_e1,_sc,_TOC,REQ,_updOp(_cred,_data,_auth),_T
OC),t1,[t1,t1]) ^ 
Happens(e(_e2,_TOC,_AI,RES,_updOp(_cred,_data,_vCode),_
TOC),t2,[t1,t1+d1]) ^ (_vCode ≠ Nil) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_e3,_TOC,_A,REQ,_notifO(_cred,_data,_auth,_h)
,_TOC),t3,[t2,t2+d2]) 
According to R1 when a call of an update operation in a 
_TOC is detected at some time point t1 (see event 
Happens(e(_e1,_sc,_TOC,REQ,_updOp(_cred,_data,_auth),_T
OC),t1,[t1,t1])) and a response to this call occurs after it 
(see event Happens(e(  _e2  ,_TOC,  _AI,  RES,_updOp(_cred, 
_data,_verCode),_TOC),t2,[t1,t2+d1])) indicating that the 
request has been granted (see condition (_vCode  ≠  Nil) in 
the rule), the monitor should also check for the existence of 
another event showing the call of an operation in some 
authorisation agent _A to notify the receipt and execution of 
the update request (see Happens(e(_e3,_TOC,_CA, 
REQ,_notifO(_cred,_data,_auth,_h),_TOC),t3,[t2,t2+d2]))
1
. The above model has two limitations in providing assurance 
for the integrity-at-rest property: (1) it cannot capture 
updates of data that might have been carried out without 
using the update interface assumed of _TOC (i.e., 
_updOp(_cred,_data,_vCode)), and (2) it cannot check that 
the operation _updOp has checked authorisation rights before 
updating data, and  
A hybrid model could be used in this case to overcome 
partially the first of these limitations. More specifically, a 
hybrid model in this case could be based on periodic testing 
to detect if stored data have been modified and monitor the 
periods between the tests that revealed data modifications to 
check if appropriate notifications have also been sent. Data 
                                                            
1
 Note that the operation signatures used in the rule may change 
depending on _TOC without affecting the generality of the rule. 
modifications could be detected by obtaining the hash value 
of the relevant data file in the TOC periodically. Then, if 
across the execution of two consecutive tests, the last 
retrieved hash value of the file is different from the previous 
hash value, a data modification action can be deduced. In 
parallel with the execution of this periodic test, the hybrid 
model will also monitor the execution of notification 
operations. Hence, when a data modification action is 
detected by two consecutive tests, the hybrid model could 
also check whether a correlated notification operation has 
been executed within the period between the tests.  
  This hybrid model model can be expressed using the 
following monitoring rule and assumption: 
Rule R2: Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,EXC(Tper), 
_getHash(_TOC,_file,_h1),_CA), t1, [t1,t1])  ^ 
HoldsAt(LastHash(_file,_h2,t2),t1) ^ (_h1 ≠ _h2) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_e3,_TOC,_CA,REQ,_notifO(_cred,_data, 
_auth,_h1),_TOC),t3,[t2,t1]) 
Assumption A1: Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,REQ, 
_getHash(_TOC,_file,_h1),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])  ^ 
HoldsAt(LastHash(_file,_h2,t2),t1) ^ (_h1 ≠ _h2) ⇒ 
Terminates(_e1,LastHash(_file,_h2,t2),t1) ^  
Initiates(_e1,LastHash(_file,_h1,t1),t1) 
Rule  R2 is “hybrid” as it includes normal monitoring 
events (i.e., REQ and RES events) and events that trigger the 
execution of tests (i.e., EXC events). R2 expresses a hybrid 
dependent mode model where evidence arising from testing 
triggers the acquisition of monitoring evidence. Hence, 
testing is the primary form of assessment. In particular, R2 
forces the execution of the event Happens(e(_e1, _CA, _TOC, 
EXC(Tper),  _getHash(_TOC,  _file,_h1),_TOC),  t1,[t1,t1]) 
periodically every Tper time units to invoke  the operation 
_getHash  in the testing interface of _TOC and obtain the 
current hash value (_h1) of the data file (_file) of _TOC. If 
this value is different from the hash value recorded by a 
previous test at some t2 (i.e., the value recorded in the fluent 
LastHash(_file,_h2,t2),t1), rule R2 checks if an update 
notification has also occurred between t2 and t1, as 
expressed by the monitoring event 
Happens(e(_e3,_TOC,_A,REQ,_notifO(_cred,_data,_auth,_h1
),_TOC),t3,[t2,t1]). The hybrid model uses also a 
monitoring assumption (i.e., A1). This assumption is used in 
the model to update the hash value recorded in the fluent 
LastHash, if a test retrieves a hash value that is different from 
the last recorded one. 
Although the above model can capture data updates that 
have taken place without the invocation of the file updating 
interface, it cannot guarantee that it can capture all possible 
updates that might have taken place. In particular, it won't be 
able to detect if more than one updates have taken place 
between two consecutive executions of the periodic test. 
Hence, it addresses the first of the limitations of the 
monitoring problem  (i.e., limitation (1)) only partially.    
To address the second limitation of the monitoring model 
(i.e., limitation (2)), it is possible to construct a different 
hybrid model. This model could rely on testing to ensure that 
every time that an agent that requests a data alteration, it has 
the authorisation right to do the requested alteration. This 
model can be expressed by the monitoring rule below:  
Rule R3: Happens(e(_e1,_sc,_TOC,REQ,_updOp(_cred,_data, 
_auth),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])  ^ 
Happens(e(_e2,_TOC,_AI,RES,_updOp(_cred,_data,_vCode1),
_TOC),t2,[t1,t1+d1]) ^ (_vCode1 ≠ Nil) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_e3,_CA,_AI,EXC,_authorO(_cred,_auth,_vCode2)
,_TOC),t3,[t2,t2+d2])^(_vCode2≠Nil) 
Rule R3 monitors requests for updates of _TOC data 
through its normal updating interface. However, for every 
such request that is granted by _TOC, it requests the execution 
of a test to check if the entity that requested the update had 
indeed the authorisation to update data. This is expressed by 
the EXC event 
Happens(e(_e3,_CA,_AI,EXC,_authorO(_cred,_auth,_verCode
2),_TOC),t3,[t2,t2+d2])) and the condition _verCode2  ≠ 
Nil. In R3, the monitoring evidence triggers the execution of 
tests. Hence, the rule expresses a dependent hybrid model 
where monitoring is the primary form of assessment. Rules 
R2 and R3 are examples of general time correlation 
structures that may arise in dependent hybrid certification 
model and which are shown in Figure 1. 
Part (a) of the figure shows dependent hybrid 
certification models where testing is the dominant form of 
assessment. In such models, test plans each consisting of a 
series of tests (i.e., {Testn1,…,TestnL}) are executed 
according to some periodic schedule. Assuming that the 
execution of a test plan starts at ts
(n)
 and ends at te
(n)
, the 
hybrid model may also check for monitoring events that 
occurred within the interval [ts
(n)
–d1, te
(n)
+d2] in order to 
provide an assessment of the security property of interest. 
Note that the length of the execution of each test plan and the 
monitoring events found within [ts
(n)
–d1, te
(n)
+d2]  may vary. 
  
Figure 1. Dependent mode hybrid certification models 
Part (b) of the figure shows the timelines of evidence 
collection in dependent hybrid certification models where 
monitoring is the dominant form of assessment. In such 
models following the collection of monitoring evidence 
(events), tests plans are executed to cross-check/complete it. 
The execution of these plans starts within the range [tm
(n)
, 
tm
(n)
+d] where tm
(n)
 is the time of occurrence of the last event 
in a pattern of events that should trigger the execution of the 
plan and d is a period set by the model. The length of the 
execution of each test plan may vary. 
D. Example 2: Hybrid, independent mode models  
 Our second example shows the use of a hybrid approach 
in certifying cloud service availability. As defined in [9], this 
property expresses the ability of a TOC to produce a non-
faulty response within a certain period of time and is 
measured by the percentage of calls that satisfy this 
condition over an assessment period. An independent hybrid 
model for the certification of TOC availability could be 
based on collecting evidence regarding the availability of a 
TOC through monitoring and testing independently (i.e., 
without any of these activities being triggered by outcomes 
of the other) and then correlating and cross-checking the 
collected pools of evidence to produce a hybrid assessment 
of the property. More specifically, the hybrid model could 
include monitoring formulas to record instances of 
invocation of TOC operators where TOC produced a 
response within the acceptable time limit and the instances 
where it did not, and keep a record of counters of these 
instances from which an overall availability measure could 
be drawn.  The formulas that could be used to collect this 
monitoring evidence are as follows: 
Assumption A2 (monitoring evidence): 
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,REQ,_OP(_data),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1])
^ Happens(e(_e2,_TOC,_CA,RES,_OP(_data),_TOC), 
t2,[t1,t1+tav]) ^ HoldsAt(MCounterA(_TOC,_MCA),t2)⇒ 
Terminates(_e1,MCounterA(_TOC, _MCA), t2) ^   
Initiates(_e1,MCounterA(_TOC, _MCA+1), t2)^  
Initiates(_e1,MAvail(_TOC,_OP(_data),t2–t1), t2)  
Assumption A3 (monitoring evidence): 
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_OC,REQ,_OP(_data),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1]) 
^¬Happens(e(_e2,_TOC,_CA,RES,_OP(_data),_TOC),t2,[t1,t1
+tav]))^ HoldsAt(MCounterU(_TOC,_MCU), t2) ⇒ 
Terminates(_e1,MCounterU(_TOC,_MCU), t2) ^ 
Initiates(_e1,MCounterU(_TOC, _MCU+1), t2) ^ 
Initiates(_e1,MUnav(_TOC,_OP(_data),t2–t1),t2)  
The first of the above monitoring formulas (i.e., 
assumption A2) monitors calls to any operation in a _TOC and 
the responses to them (see events Happens(e(_e1, _CA, _TOC, 
REQ, _OP(_data),_TOC), t1, R(t1,t1)) and Happens(e(_e2, 
_CA, _TOC, RES, _OP(_data), _TOC), t2,[t1,t1+tav])) and if 
a response is within the required period (tav), it updates the 
counter of instances where _TOC was available and records 
the related call (in fluents MCounterA(_TOC,_MCA,t2) and 
MAvail(_TOC,_OP(_data),t2–t1), respectively). The second 
formula (i.e., assumption A3) monitors calls to _TOC 
operations that did not produce a response within the 
required time, and keeps an overall counter of unavailability 
and the related calls in fluents MCounterU(_TOC,_MCU,t2) and 
MUnav(_TOC,_OP(_data),t2–t1)). 
The hybrid model for the certification of availability 
could also incorporate a test-based availability assessment 
sub-model. This sub-model can execute a randomly selected 
operation in the interface of _TOC periodically to check its 
availability, and keep a record of instances of test-triggered 
invocations of operations of TOC in which a response was 
produced within the required time period, and instances of 
test-triggered invocations where it was not. 
This sub-model is expressed by following formulas for 
collecting testing evidence: 
Assumption A4 (testing evidence): 
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC, EXC(Tper), 
_x=random(interface(_TOC)),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1]) ^ 
Happens(e(_e2,_TOC, _CA RES,_x,_TOC),t2,[t1,t1+tav])^ 
HoldsAt(TCounterA(_TOC,_TCA),t2) 
⇒ Terminates(_e1,TCounterA(_TOC,_TCA),t2) ^   
Initiates(_e1,TCounterA(_TOC,_TCA+1),t2)^  
Initiates(_e1,TAvail(_TOC,_x,t2–t1),t2)  
Assumption A5 (testing evidence): 
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC, EXC(Tper), 
_x=random(interface(_TOC)),_TOC),t1,[t1,t1]) ^ 
¬Happens(e(_e2,, _TOC, _CA, RES,_x,_TOC),t2, 
[t1,t1+tav])^ HoldsAt(TCounterU(_TOC,_TCU),t2) ⇒ 
Terminates(_e1,TCounterU(_TOC,_TCU),t2) ^ 
Initiates(_e1,TCounterU(_TOC,_TCU+1),t2) ^ 
Initiates(_e1,TUnav(_TOC,_x, t2–t1),t2)  
A4 and A5 are similar to assumptions A2 and A3 
respectively except that, instead of monitoring real 
operation calls, they execute a randomly selected operation 
in the interface of _TOC periodically (see the event 
Happens(e(_e1,_CA,_TOC,EXC(Tper),_x=random(interface(_TOC
)), _TOC),t1,[t1,t1])) to check its availability, and update 
fluents recording the overall counters of availability and 
unavailability of _TOC and the test executions that revealed 
them. 
In the hybrid model, the assumption pairs (A2, A3), and 
(A4, A5) are used to collect evidence independently without 
any monitoring events triggering tests or vice versa. 
However, it might still be desirable to correlate the testing 
and monitoring evidence. For example: 
(a) The overall availability measure may be computed on the 
basis of both test and monitoring evidence as A =  
(_MCA + _TCA)/(_MCA+ _TCA+_MCU+ _TCU). 
(b) Testing events may be considered as valid evidence of 
TOC availability only if all real calls of TOC in the range 
[tmon–d, tmon+d] produced responses within tav. 
(c) Monitored calls to TOC that produced a response within 
the maximum allowed period tav may be disregarded in 
computing TOC’s availability if the relevant responses 
were marginally below tav and all testing events for the 
same TOC in the range [tmon–d,tmon+d] (tmon is the 
timestamp of a monitored call) produced responses after 
the maximum allowed period tav.  
(d) An availability measure based on testing (monitoring) 
evidence will be used for issuing a certificate only if the 
availability measure based on monitoring (testing) 
evidence over the same period is no more than 1% 
different from it.   
Clearly, several other combinations of monitoring and 
testing evidence may be defined. In general, in an 
independent hybrid certification model: 
• individual (or groups of) instances of monitoring and 
testing evidence may be cross-validated against each 
other before producing an overall assessment on the basis 
of any of these types of evidence (see (b) and (c) above); 
• aggregate assessments based on each type of evidence 
may be validated against an aggregate assessment based 
on the other type before issuing a certificate (see (d) 
above); or  
• an aggregate assessment may be formulated from both 
monitoring and testing evidence as in case (a) above. 
 Compared to non-hybrid models for certifying 
availability, the hybrid model introduced above can produce 
availability assessments of higher confidence as the 
monitoring and testing evidence can be cross-checked before 
being used in an assessment (and certificate) and can both be 
included in a certificate depending on the chosen validation 
checks. Hybrid models offer also a more extended pool of 
evidence and possibilities to decide which data are relevant 
and of sufficient quality so that they can be taken into 
consideration for issuing a hybrid certificate. Apart from 
increasing the confidence level of assessments, hybrid 
models are also more customisable than traditional 
certification models since they offer the choice of deciding 
how test and monitoring evidence should be correlated, 
cross-checked and used in assessments.  
 
IV.  COMPARISON BETWEEN HYBRID AND TRADITIONAL  
CERTIFICATION MODELS 
In this section we present a comparison between hybrid 
and traditional certification of cloud services. Traditional 
approaches for certifying security properties rely on manual 
inspections and audits, proving to be static, inflexible, non-
automated and unable to realise the economic dimension that 
the Cloud entails [14]. As already stated, CSA has generated 
the STAR self-assessment certification framework that 
allows cloud providers to submit self-assessment reports, 
when fully implemented [6]. At the same time, CSA has 
generated the Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM), which 
provides a framework of controls that gives detailed 
understanding of security concepts and principles that are 
aligned to the Cloud Security Alliance guidance in 13 
domains [15]. CCM facilitates regulatory compliance and 
provides organizations with the needed structure, detail and 
clarity relating to information security tailored to the cloud 
industry. It is also specifically designed to provide 
fundamental security principles to guide cloud vendors and 
to assist prospective cloud customers in assessing the 
overall security risk of a cloud provider, integrating the 
ISO/IEC 27001 management systems standard Error! 
Reference source not found.. However, CCM is human-
process centric requiring from the companies that adopt it to 
address the issues that they define critical concerning cloud 
security and to pre-assess how mature their systems are 
[16][20]. CCM enables the integration, monitoring and 
managing of cloud services through a framework that can 
take care of the elementary issues regarding cloud security 
[16], but it does not support certification as an automated 
service in the cloud [17]. 
 
Traditional certification models (i.e. ISO/IEC 27001, 
NIST) also require manual inspections and are unable to 
provide the required level of assurance in cloud computing 
and to fit the dynamic nature of the cloud, focusing on 
monolithic software components [4] and failing to address 
on-demand self-service, dynamic allocation of resources and 
multi-tenancy [14][18]. Additionally, traditional 
certification models lack in trust, transparency and accuracy, 
as they do not support the constant provision of information 
about the security of cloud services, unlike our hybrid 
approach that relies on incremental monitoring and 
automated testing and it is focused on cloud services. 
IT audits have been widely used in providing security 
assurance. Security auditing approaches focus on providing 
guidelines and are not automated [8]. One more drawback is 
that they require that the consumer relies on third-party 
auditors for security assurance.  
Common Criteria (CC) certification uses Evaluation 
Technical Reports [19]. CC has also a human-centric  
approach, unlike our model, which is not designed to 
support automated security certification, targeting static, 
monolithic systems and requiring a large investment of 
resources [4]. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The certification of cloud service security properties 
often needs to be based on hybrid models combining testing 
and monitoring evidence that have been collected 
dynamically during service provision. In this paper, we have 
examined some of the basic characteristics of hybrid 
certification models based on the formal modelling of 
examples of such models. Hybrid certification models as 
introduced are based on continuous monitoring of security 
services and automated testing of these. Consequently, the 
new dynamic models will support automation of the 
certification process and enhanced customer reliability and 
trust to the cloud services compared to the previous 
traditional ways of certifying security properties on the 
cloud. We have shown that the combination of testing and 
monitoring evidence can happen in two basic models 
(independent and dependent) and examined temporal 
relationships between the testing and monitoring process 
under these two modes. The example models that we have 
presented are implementable in EVEREST, the monitoring 
infrastructure of the CUMULUS project. Our next steps are 
to expand the certification model specification language of 
CUMULUS to enable the definition of hybrid models, and 
evaluate our approach experimentally. 
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